Day of Deceit

The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor

by Robert B. Stinnett

  Day of Deceit is a must read for anyone who wishes to completely understand the day "that will live in infamy." Robert B. Stinnett spent 13 years conducting meticulous research into the idea that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt knew that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. In fact, Stinnett goes further and asserts that FDR deliberately goaded the Japanese into attacking the United States in order to ensure American participation in World War II. Stinnett then accuses the President and key leaders in the U.S. Navy and Army of preventing Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet , and his Army counterpart, Lt. Gen. Walter Short, from mounting an adequate defense. Finally, Stinnett asserts that the U.S. Navy and others have conspired to hide the evidence from Congressional inquiries and historians.

  Many of the accusations above have been outlined by others. John Toland’s provocative 1982 book Infamy did not go as far as accusing FDR of conspiring to deliberately provoke the Japanese into starting hostilities with the United States. I have read Infamy also, but I was just as likely to believe in a comedy of errors resulting in the debacle. Throughout Day of Deceit, I tried to maintain a healthy skepticism, but Stinnett blew it away with thorough explanations and excellent documentation.

  In the first place, Stinnett discusses a memo for the President written on 7 October, 1940 by one then Lt. Cmdr. McCollum of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). The McCollum memo discussed the world situation at that point and the need for action to prevent the Japanese from crippling the British Empire while it was busy defying Hitler. The memo proposed an 8-step plan to provoke the Japanese into a war with the United States, thus preventing the Japanese from aiding the other Axis powers. As a matter of undisputed historical record, the Roosevelt Administration did implement exactly the steps prescribed. But is this merely hearsay and rumor about a secret memo? Well, Stinnett provides a photocopy of the original memo in Appendix A.

  The author also details how FDR ordered sorties by cruisers of the Asiatic Squadron into Japanese home waters in the hope of provoking an incident. The Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, one Admiral Richardson, apparently objected strenuously to his cruisers and their crews being used as live bait. Richardson was quietly shoved aside when FDR created the "two-ocean navy." The CINC of the new Atlantic Fleet was Ernest P. King, while the CINC of the Pacific Fleet was Husband E. Kimmel. The Asiatic Squadron of Admiral Thomas Hart was now styled the Asiatic Fleet. FDR also promoted the head of the ONI, one Captain Walter Anderson, to be the new Commander of Battleships, Pacific Fleet. Anderson was not a popular choice among the other admirals at the time, and Anderson is implicated by Stinnett in FDR’s machinations. Rear Admiral Anderson was not aboard his flagship (USS Maryland) on 7 Dec., 1941. This might have been a coincidence, but Anderson did pick certain key men for Kimmel’s intelligence staff—and may have had a hand in the unprecedented Navy interference in the FBI’s monitoring of the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu.

  The author also provides an incredible look into the remarkable signals intelligence programs of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army that targeted Japan. The author also goes into the greatest detail that I have ever seen on the communications and code systems of the Imperial Japanese Navy. These discussions are necessary to draw the background to understand why the attack on Pearl Harbor should not, and could not, have come as the surprise that it has been portrayed to be. To paint this picture, the author made impressive use of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to obtain the information. Often, original intercepts and translations were remarkably missing from the declassified files. The author cleverly found routing slips that proved the existence of many of the missing documents—and who signed for them. The author also asks the reader to ponder just why the U.S. Navy and the National Security Agency (NSA) are still keeping secret some of the original translations of radio intercepts from that era. Although one might argue that the technical secrets of the Japanese code techniques are sensitive, how can the text of the six decade old messages themselves harm present day national security?

  The author also shows how many of the principals in the drama have contradicted their sworn testimony before various Congressional investigations (1945-6 and 1995) in their own memoirs. For example, on several occasions, then Lt. Cmdr. Joseph Rochefort of Station HYPO at Pearl Harbor and Captain Layton, Kimmel’s chief of intelligence, contradict themselves on the question of whether or not the top Japanese naval code (usually known to historians as the JN-25 series, Navy cryptanalysts called it the 5-Number Code in 1941) was not being read before Pearl Harbor. The author also notes how many key personnel from the radio interception listening posts with first hand knowledge of key events were never called as witnesses.

  One of the remarkable features of the discussion of the trade craft of gathering signals and communications intelligence was its focus on call signs and traffic analysis. The recognition of call signs showed just who was talking to whom. The consolidated call sign list also permitted the reconstruction of the Japanese order of battle. Each ship, unit, and key officer had their own call sign. These would sometimes be changed. In fact, special call signs were assigned for the Pearl Harbor operation; however, Stinnett claims that Navy cryppies quickly saw through the deception and compiled a new call sign list. He provides photocopies of some drafts of these lists.

  In addition to intercepts of the 5-Num code and the analysis of call signs, the Army and Navy intelligence community was also quite involved with decryption of the Purple Code system used by the Japanese Foreign Ministry. And here we have a remarkable fact. Although the ONI and the Army Signals Intelligence Service gave reverse-engineered Purple code machines to the British in London and Singapore as well as Station CAST on Corregidor in the Philippines, no Purple machine was given to Station HYPO at Pearl Harbor. And furthermore, why was Lt. Gen. Short kept completely in the dark about the intelligence being gathered by the Army’s Station FIVE at Ft. Shafter?

  But other questions abound. The President personally ordered the North Pacific to be declared a Vacant Sea—with no U.S. ships allowed therein—approximately two weeks before the Japanese attack. At that time Admiral Kimmel was conducting a remarkable war game exercise with this fleet. The Lexington task force was designated as the aggressor force. It was to conduct an attack on Pearl Harbor from the Prokofiev Sea Mount, some 200 miles north of Oahu. In two weeks, Nagumo’s First Air Fleet would do the same thing for real. Given the President’s new orders, Kimmel terminated his exercises. Lt. Gen. Short and Admiral Kimmel requested more aerial reconnaissance assets. Two B-24’s were to be sent. One arrived on 5 December unarmed. While awaiting armament installation, this aircraft was destroyed on 7 Dec. Short and Kimmel were instructed to go to a heightened alert status in case of possible Japanese moves—but they were also told not to alarm the civilian populace. Kimmel and Short were blamed for not doing enough to protect Hawaii, but they were clearly being handcuffed by their masters.

  Stinnett also levels the charge that officers of Naval Intelligence deliberately withheld vital information from Admiral Kimmel. He provides numerous examples of this. Why was Kimmel not told that the Japanese consulate in Honolulu was preparing bombing plots of Pearl Harbor as early as August? The most blatant example had to be the mysterious case of the SS Lurline. The radiomen of the Lurline had picked up Japanese transmissions emanating from the North Pacific during its voyage to Honolulu. There can be no mistake because of the Vacant Sea order and the fact that the Japanese equivalent of Morse code (kana) was distinctive. When the Lurline docked on 3 December, all of the relevant data was turned over to Naval Intelligence voluntarily and enthusiastically. But the Navy also confiscated the complete radio logs, which disappeared somewhere in the Fourteenth Naval District HQ in early 1942. Kimmel was not notified of the incident.

  Oddly enough, the task groups of the Enterprise and Lexington were ordered to sortie and deliver fighters to Midway and Wake Islands. The original order from Washington specified that Midway was to get Army fighters. Short and Kimmel agreed that this was silly since the Army fighters could not land on the Enterprise. Therefore, Marine fighters were sent instead. Stinnett notes that these sorties meant that the fastest and most modern ships of the fleet were at sea when Pearl Harbor was attacked.

  Another popular belief is that the Japanese maintained perfect radio silence during the transit of the First Air Fleet across the Northern Pacific. The Japanese themselves have made this claim. Stinnett demolishes this claim, citing the interception records of Navy listening posts. One interesting anecdote concerns transmissions from the HIMJS Akagi to the units of the First Air Fleet. The transmissions in the 4690-4700 kilocycle range were heard by several listening posts. But I wondered why the Akagi would be sending long-range transmissions to her consorts. The answer was provided in the next chapter. It seems that a huge storm had scattered Nagumo’s task force, and many units were beyond the horizon. Nagumo’s flagship therefore resorted to using short range (100 mi.) radio transmissions. But a freak solar storm had affected the ionosphere, allowing the transmissions to travel greater distances than intended. It didn’t matter—no one was telling Kimmel anything anyway.

  But why keep Kimmel in the dark? The explanation provided is rather subtle. If Kimmel confronted the Japanese as they approached Hawaii, the Japanese could claim that the U.S. was trying to interfere with them in international waters. But, it is a conceded historical fact that Roosevelt told all commanders that he desired that Japan "commit the first overt act." By allowing the Japanese to attack a U.S. naval base without direct provocation, it would be easier to sell the public on the need to go to war.

  The author states that he believes that Roosevelt was ultimately correct in pushing America into World War II. And he acknowledges how tough of a sell it would have been. But he is also correct in pointing out that the methods used raise disturbing questions. And he also wonders why the lies continue nearly sixty years after the fact. He points out, correctly in my view, that we owe to posterity and the memory of the fallen to tell the truth about what happened on a sunny Sunday morning in Hawaii.

  If you have any interest at all in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, read this book.

  If you have any interest at all in the war with Iraq watch this link: www.youtube.com/motive